Description

**In his second public contribution to ending the American intervention in Vietnam, Daniel Ellsberg brings together and revises his papers that best explain US policy and strategies during the war.**
Drawing upon his virtually unique range of experience as a participant, field observer, analyst, and critic, *Papers on the War* shares a selection of Daniel Ellsberg’s writings as he critiques the presence of US policies in Vietnam.
With the major contribution of a greatly expanded and redefined version of his crucial study “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine,” Ellsberg reveals consistent patterns of decision-making with respect to Indo-china that ran from Truman’s Administration into Nixon’s.
From the first participant permitted to make use of the entire study that led to the Pentagon Papers, this book shares analysis on the invasion of Laos, the internal policies of South Vietnam, the failure of rural pacification, the American way of war, and the renewed escalation in the spring of 1972.